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We develop a framework that allows one to model the optimal bundling problem of a multiproduct monopolist
providing interrelated goods with an arbitrary degree of complementarity or substitutability. Characterizations of
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acknowledged.optimal bundling strategies are derived for the seller in the case of long-tailed valuations and tastes for the products.
We show, in particular, that if goods provided in a Vickrey auction or any other revenue equivalent auction are
substitutes and bidders' tastes for the objects are not extremely heavy-tailed, then the monopolist prefers separate
provision of the products. However, if the goods are complements and consumers' tastes are extremely thick-
tailed, then the seller prefers providing the products on a single auction. We also present results on consumers'
preferences over bundled auctions in the case when their valuations exhibit heavy-tailedness. In addition, we obtain
characterizations of optimal bundling strategies for a monopolist who provides complements or substitutes for pro¯t-
maximizing prices to buyers with long-tailed tastes.
JEL Classi¯cation: D42, D44, L12, L21
KEYWORDS: Optimal bundling strategies, multiproduct monopolist, Vickrey auction, substitutes, complements,
heavy-tailed valuations, tastes, robustness1. INTRODUCTION AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
1.1. Optimal bundling decisions for a multiproduct monopolist. The last quarter of a century has
witnessed a surge in the interest in the analysis of optimal bundling strategies for a multiproduct monopolist. In
particular, many studies in the literature emphasized that bundling decisions of a monopoly providing two goods de-
pend on correlations between consumers' valuations for the products (see Adams and Yellen, 1976, McAfee, McMillan
and Whinston, 1989, Schmalensee, 1984, and Salinger, 1995), the degrees of complementarity and substitutability
between the goods (e.g., Lewbel, 1985, and Venkatesh and Kamakura, 2003) and the marginal costs for the products
(see, among others, Salinger, 1995, and Venkatesh and Kamakura, 2003). Most of studies on bundling have focused,
however, on prescribed distributions for reservation prices in the case of two products and their packages, such as
bivariate uniform or Gaussian distributions, and only a few general results are available for larger bundles (e.g.,
Palfrey, 1983, Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999, 2000, and Fang and Norman, 2003a, b).3 For instance, Palfrey (1983)
obtained characterizations of the monopolist's and buyers' preferences over bundled Vickrey auctions of indepen-
dently priced goods, that is, products such that consumers' valuations for their bundles are additive in those for
the component goods, as opposed to the case of interrelated goods, e.g., substitutes or complements (see Dansby
and Conrad, 1984, Lewbel, 1985, Section 3.2 in Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999, Venkatesh and Kamakura, 2003, and
Section 4 in the present paper). Palfrey (1983) showed that, in the case of two bidders with bounded valuations
satisfying certain distributional assumptions, the seller maximizes her pro¯t by selling the goods in a single bundle;
the two buyers, however, unanimously prefer separate provision of objects to any other bundling decision. Palfrey's
(1983) results also imply that, if stand-alone valuations are concentrated on a ¯nite interval, then consumers never
unanimously prefer separate provision of items to a single Vickrey auction, ex ante, if there are more than two buyers
(see Theorems 5-7 in Palfrey, 1983). In a related paper, Chakraborty (1999) obtained characterizations of optimal
bundling strategies for a monopolist providing two independently priced goods on Vickrey auctions under a regular-
ity condition on quantiles of reservation prices. As follows from Proschan's (1965) results given by Proposition 6.1 in
Appendix A1 in this paper, this regularity condition is satis¯ed for symmetric valuations with log-concave densities.
Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) investigated optimal bundling decisions for a multiproduct monopolist providing large
bundles of independently priced goods with zero marginal costs (information goods) for pro¯t-maximizing prices
to consumers whose valuations belong to a class that includes, again by Proschan (1965), reservation prices with
symmetric log-concave densities.4 Among other results, Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) showed that, in the latter
setting, if the seller prefers bundling a certain number of goods to selling them separately and if the optimal price
per good for the bundle is less than the mean valuation, then bundling any greater number of goods will further
increase the seller's pro¯ts, compared to the case where the additional goods are sold separately. According to the
result, if consumers' valuations have the above regularity property, then a form of superadditivity for bundling deci-
sions holds, that is, the bene¯ts to the seller grow as the number of goods in the bundle increases.5 Recently, Fang
and Norman (2003b) showed that a multiproduct monopolist providing bundles of independently priced goods to
3The terms \reservation prices" and \valuations" are used as synonyms in this paper, in accordance with the well-established tradition
in the bundling literature.
4More precisely, according to Proschan's (1965) results given by Proposition 6.1 in Appendix A1, the distributional assumptions in
Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) are satis¯ed for valuations with log-concave densities symmetric about the mean reservation price. In
particular, the assumptions are satis¯ed for valuations with a ¯nite support [v;v] distributed as the truncation XI(jX ¡ ¹j < h); h > 0;
of an arbitrary random variable X with a log-concave density symmetric about ¹ = (v + v)=2; where h = (v ¡ v)=2 and I(¢) is the
indicator function (see also Remark 2 in An, 1998).
5This property is similar to the case of Vickrey auctions with two buyers (see Remark 2 in Palfrey, 1983).
1consumers with valuations with log-concave densities prefers selling them separately to any other bundling decision
if the marginal costs of all the products are greater than the mean valuation; under some additional distributional
assumptions, the seller prefers providing the goods as a single bundle to any other bundling decision if the marginal
costs of the goods are identical and are less than the mean reservation price.
To our knowledge, all general results in the bundling literature available for an arbitrary number of goods are
based on conditions which are satis¯ed only for valuations with light-tailed distributions, such as those with log-
concave densities or with a bounded support, and also typically maintain the assumption that the goods provided
are independently priced. In particular, as far as we know, there are no results in the literature on the optimal
bundling problem in the case of heavy-tailed valuations for the products, even in the case of independently priced
goods and bundles consisting of two items.
1.2. Heavy-tailedness paradigm. Much of the modern literature in economics and ¯nance have focused on
the study of the so-called \thick-tailedness" paradigm. This stream of literature goes back to Mandelbrot (1963)
(see also the papers in Mandelbrot, 1997, and Fama, 1965), who pioneered the study of heavy-tailed distributions
with tails declining as x¡®; ® > 0; in these ¯elds. If a model involves a r.v. X with such thick-tailed distribution,
then
P(jXj > x) » x¡®: (1.1)
The r.v. X for which this is the case has ¯nite moments EjXjp of order p < ®: However, the moments are in¯nite
for p ¸ ®.
It was documented in numerous studies that the time series encountered in many ¯elds in economics and ¯-
nance are heavy-tailed (see the discussion in Loretan and Phillips, 1994, Meerschaert and Sche²er, 2000, Gabaix,
Gopikrishnan, Plerou and Stanley, 2003, and references therein). Motivated by these empirical ¯ndings, a number of
studies in ¯nancial economics have focused on portfolio and value-at-risk modelling with heavy-tailed returns (see,
e.g., the reviews in Du±e and Pan, 1997, Uchaikin and Zolotarev, 1999, Ch. 17, and Glasserman, Heidelberger
and Shahabuddin, 2002). Several authors considered problems of statistical inference for data from thick-tailed
populations (see Loretan and Phillips, 1994, the papers in Adler, Feldman and Taqqu, 1998, and references therein).
Mandelbrot (1963) presented evidence that historical daily changes of cotton prices have the tail index ® ¼ 1:7;
and thus have in¯nite variances. Using di®erent models and statistical techniques, subsequent research reported the
following estimates of the tail parameters ® for returns on various stocks and stock indices: 3 < ® < 5 (Jansen and
de Vries, 1991); 2 < ® < 4 (Loretan and Phillips, 1994); 1:5 < ® < 2 (McCulloch, 1996, 1997); 0:9 < ® < 2 (Rachev
and Mittnik, 2000). Recent studies (see Gabaix et. al., 2003, and references therein) have found that the returns
on many stocks and stock indices have the tail exponent ® ¼ 3; while the distributions of trading volume and the
number of trades on ¯nancial markets obey power laws (1.1) with ® ¼ 1:5 and ® ¼ 3:4; respectively. As discussed in
Gabaix et. al. (2003), these estimates of the tail indices ® are robust to di®erent types and sizes of ¯nancial markets,
market trends and are similar for di®erent countries. Motivated by these empirical ¯ndings, Gabaix et. al. (2003)
proposed a model that demonstrates that the above power laws for stock returns, trading volume and the number
of trades are explained by trading of large market participants, namely, the largest mutual funds whose sizes have
the tail exponent ® ¼ 1: Power laws (1.1) with ® ¼ 1 (Zipf laws) have also been found to hold for ¯rm sizes (see
2Axtell, 2001) and city sizes (see Gabaix, 1999a, b for discussion and explanations of the Zipf law for cities). One
should also note that some studies also report the tail exponent to be close to one or even slightly less than one for
such ¯nancial time series as Bulgarian lev/US dollar exchange spot rates and increments of the market time process
for Deutsche Bank price record (see Rachev and Mittnik, 2000).
The fact that a number of economic and ¯nancial time series have the tail exponents of approximately one is very
important in the context of the results in this paper: as we demonstrate, optimal bundling strategies for substitutes
and consumers' valuations and tastes with the tail exponents ® < 1 and in¯nite means are the opposites of those
for complements and buyers' reservation prices and tastes with ® > 1 for which the ¯rst moment is ¯nite.
It is important to emphasize here that heavy-tailedness concepts provide a natural framework for modelling
marketing strategies for goods with extreme valuations in the real world. For example, strategies involving exclusion
of goods with extreme valuations and selling them separately are often employed on the market, in particular, by
cable and direct satellite broadcast television ¯rms. The latter ¯rms typically o®er a \basic" bundle and use such
strategies as pay-per-view approach for unusual special events such as, for instance, boxing matches (see Bakos and
Brynjolfsson, 1999). The high valuations for the special events are concentrated among a small fraction of consumers
and thus are likely to be very heavy-tailed. Season tickets for entertainment performances o®ered by sporting and
cultural organizations might illustrate the dual pattern in bundling. It seems plausible that most of the demand for
season tickets is concentrated around a relative small fraction of consumers that have high (and very thick-tailed)
valuations for performances o®ered by the entertainment organizations. However, in contrast to television ¯rms,
the companies o®ering the tickets often choose providing them in bundles to consumers with extreme tastes for the
performances.6
One should also note here that distributions with log-concave densities for which several general results in the
optimal bundling literature exist (see the previous subsection) cannot be used to model heavy-tailedness. This is
because any such density has at most an exponential tail and thus all its moments are ¯nite (see An, 1998, and
Section 2 in this paper).
Several frameworks have been proposed to model heavy-tailedness phenomena, including stable distributions,
Pareto distributions, multivariate t¡distributions, mixtures of normals, power exponential distributions, ARCH
processes, mixed di®usion jump processes, variance gamma and normal inverse Gamma distributions. However,
the debate concerning the values of the tail indices for di®erent heavy-tailed ¯nancial data and on appropriateness
of their modelling based on certain above distributions is still under way in empirical literature. In particular, as
indicated before, a number of studies continue to ¯nd tail parameters less than two in di®erent ¯nancial data sets
and also argue that stable distributions are appropriate for their modelling.
6see Remark 5.4 in this paper for explanation of the dual patterns in the bundling decisions in the above settings on the basis of our
results.
31.3. The main results of the paper: optimal bundling decisions for a multiproduct monopolist
in the case of heavy-tailed reservation prices and interrelated goods. The present paper contributes to
the existing literature on bundling and thick-tailedness in economics in a number of ways. First, we develop a
framework that allows one to model the optimal bundling problem of a multiproduct monopolist providing large
bundles of interrelated goods with an arbitrary degree of complementarity or substitutability. Second, we derive
characterizations of optimal bundling strategies for the seller in this setup in the case of long-tailed valuations and
tastes for the products, where, as indicated in Subsection 1.1, no results in the literature are available even in the
case of two independently priced goods, to our knowledge. Third, our analysis provides a uni¯ed approach to the
study of optimal bundling problems in the case where the goods are provided on an auction as well as in the setting
where the prices for the products are set by the monopolist (see Sections 3-5 that present our main results along the
above aims of the paper). In particular, the approach developed in this paper reveals that the analysis of optimal
bundling strategies in both of the above cases is based on the same probabilistic concepts and results (see the next
subsection for details).
Moreover, our study shows that patterns in the optimal bundling strategies are the opposites of one another,
depending on the degrees of thick-tailedness of consumers' valuations and the degrees of complementarity and
substitutability among the goods provided (e.g., Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 and Theorems 5.1 and 5.2). In that, for
instance, the solutions to the optimal bundling problem with not too long-tailed valuations are the opposites of those
in the case of very thick-tailed reservation prices, even in the case of independently priced goods. In particular,
our analysis shows that many of the results available in the literature for independently priced goods with very
light-tailed valuations (such as reservation prices with log-concave densities or those with a bounded support) are
reversed in the case of valuations with very thick-tailed distributions. However, the results for very light-tailed
reservation prices continue to hold under the assumption that distributions of the reservation prices are not too
thick-tailed. In other words, the optimal bundling strategies analyzed in the literature in the case of very light-tailed
valuations are robust to thick-tailedness assumptions for consumers' valuations as long as the distributions entering
the assumptions are not too heavy-tailed.7 However, they are reversed in the case of assumptions that involve very
thick-tailed distributions.
In addition, the approach developed in this paper allows one to study, in a uni¯ed way, both the seller's and
consumers' preferences over bundling decisions under heavy-tailed valuations. According to our results, the seller's
and the buyers' preferences over bundles continue to be the opposites of one another in the case of very thick-
tailed valuations, similar to the results with very light-tailed reservation prices available in the literature. However,
in the framework with very long-tailed valuations, consumers' surplus is maximized under separate provision of
independently priced goods, regardless of the number of buyers. This conclusion established in the present paper is
in contrast with the results available in the literature for very light-tailed case.
More precisely, we show that if the goods provided on a Vickrey auction are independently priced or are sub-
stitutes (or complements with not very high degree of complementarity) and bidders' tastes for the objects are
not very heavy-tailed, then the risk-neutral monopolist strictly prefers separate provision of the products to any
7According to well-established parlance in the many scienti¯c literatures, robustness is understood to mean sensitivity to distributional
assumptions. In the paper, the use of the terms \robust" and \robustness" accords with this tradition.
4other bundling decision (Theorem 4.1). The results are reversed, however, in the case of a risk-averse auctioneer
providing independently priced goods or complements (or substitutes with not very high degree of substitutability)
to consumers with very long-tailed tastes for the products (Theorem 4.2).8 According to our analysis, in the lat-
ter case, regardless of the number of consumers, the seller always strictly prefers providing the goods on a single
Vickrey auction to any other bundling decision, as in the setting with two buyers in Palfrey (1983). This conclusion
provides, in particular, a reversal of the results in Chakraborty (1999) from which it follows that, in the case of
symmetric valuations satisfying comparisons that hold for distributions with log-concave densities, provision of in-
dependently priced goods through separate Vickrey auctions generates larger expected pro¯ts to the seller than any
other bundling decision if the number of buyers is su±ciently large. We also obtain a characterization of consumers'
preferences over the monopolist's bundling decision in a Vickrey auction in the case of heavy-tailed valuations for
the products. We show, for instance, that if bidders' reservation prices for independently priced goods are very
heavy-tailed, as modelled by positive stable distributions (see Section 2), then they unanimously prefer separate
Vickrey auctions to any other bundling decision (Theorem 4.3 and Remark 4.2). These results are at odds with a
setting where valuations have a ¯nite distributional support in which, according to Palfrey (1983), consumers never
unanimously prefer separate provision of the products, as indicated in Subsection 1.1.
We also obtain characterizations of optimal bundling strategies for a monopolist who provides goods with an
arbitrary degree of complementarity or substitutability to consumers with heavy-tailed tastes for pro¯t-maximizing
prices (Theorems 5.1-5.4). We show, in particular, that, for products with high marginal costs, the seller's optimal
strategy is to provide complements with very heavy-tailed consumers' tastes for them separately and those with
su±ciently light-tailed valuations as a single bundle. For relatively low marginal costs, these conclusions are reversed
(Theorems 5.1 and 5.2). In addition, contrary to the case of very light-tailed valuations and independently priced
products considered in Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) and Fang and Norman (2003b), if consumers' tastes for the
products are very long-tailed, then the monopolist's optimal strategy is to provide independently priced goods or
complements with relatively high marginal costs as a single bundle and those with su±ciently low marginal costs
separately (Theorem 5.4). Our results also imply, for instance, that for positive stable distributions of tastes,
irrespective of the marginal costs of producing the goods in question, the optimal strategy is to provide the goods
as a single bundle if the goods are independently priced or are complements (Remark 5.3). Such distributions are
of particular importance since bundling models based on them satisfy the free disposal condition often imposed in
the case of information goods and in the economics of the Internet.
1.4. Probabilistic foundations for the main results. The proof of the results in this paper is based
on general results on peakedness properties of convolutions of distributions and majorization phenomena for tail
probabilities of linear combinations of random variables (r.v.'s) presented in Appendix A1. These properties and
phenomena were ¯rst analyzed, under the assumptions of log-concavity of distributions, in the seminal paper by
Proschan (1965) that found applications in the study of many problems in statistics, econometrics and economic
theory and other ¯elds (see the discussion in Ibragimov, 2005). The proof of the main results in this paper is
based on analogues of the results in Proschan (1965) in the case of heavy-tailed distributions and majorization
comparisons between powers of coe±cients of linear combinations of r.v.'s recently obtained by Ibragimov (2004)
8The assumption of seller's risk aversion is necessary in the case of very heavy-tailed tastes and valuations since otherwise the
monopolist's expected pro¯t is in¯nite for any bundling decision.
5and also presented in Ibragimov (2005). To our knowledge, the results in Ibragimov (2004, 2005) are the ¯rst
ones in the literature that give extensions of those in Proschan (1965) for comparisons between arbitrary powers
of components of linear combinations of r.v.'s and their reversals for general classes of distributions. These results
provide the key to the analysis of bundling problems for complements and substitutes and to reversals of the optimal
bundling strategies in the case of very thick-tailed valuations in this paper. Besides the analysis of optimal bundling
strategies for complements and substitutes considered in this paper, the majorization results obtained in Ibragimov
(2004, 2005) have many other applications. These applications include the study of e±ciency of linear estimators
and monotone consistency of the sample mean, robustness of the model of demand-driven innovation and spatial
competition over time, value at risk analysis as well that of inheritance models in mathematical evolutionary theory.9
The main intuition behind the analysis of optimal bundling decisions under very light-tailed valuations in the
literature (see the discussion in Palfrey, 1983, Schmalensee, 1984, Salinger, 1995, Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999,
and Fang and Norman, 2003b) is that, for such reservation prices, consumers' valuations per good for a bundle
typically have a lower variance relative to the valuations for individual goods.10 The underlying intuition that
drives our results on bundling under heavy-tailed valuations is closely related to that above. Namely, the results on
peakedness and majorization obtained in Ibragimov (2004) imply, essentially, that, in the case of not very heavy-
tailed reservation prices, the consumers' valuations per good for bundles always have less spread relative to the
valuations for component products, as measured by their peakedness (see Appendix A1 for details on the concept
of peakedness and related results). On the other hand, in the case of very heavy-tailed valuations, the spread of
reservation prices per product for bundles, as measured by peakedness, is always greater than that of valuations for
components (the reader is referred to Sections 4 and 5 for more on the intuition).
9The following list summarizes some of other applications of the main majorization results in Ibragimov (2004) presented in the
author's Ph.D. dissertation Ibragimov (2005).
(i) From the majorization results it follows that the sample mean is the best linear unbiased estimator of the population mean for
not extremely heavy-tailed populations in the sense of its peakedness properties. Moreover, in such a case, the sample mean exhibits
the important property of monotone consistency and, thus, an increase in the sample size always improves its performance. However,
e±ciency of the sample mean in the sense of its peakedness decreases with the sample size if the sample mean is used to estimate the
population center under extreme thick-tailedness. The main majorization results in Ibragimov (2004) also provide sharp concentration
inequalities for linear estimators as well as their extensions to the case of wide classes of dependent data.
(ii) Using the general majorization results, we show, for the ¯rst time in the literature, that the stylized fact that portfolio diversi¯cation
is always preferable is reversed for a wide class of distributions of risks. The class of distributions for which this is the case is the class of
extremely heavy-tailed distributions. The encouraging message of the results is that the stylized facts on diversi¯cation are nevertheless
robust to thick-tailedness of risks or returns as long as their distributions are not extremely long-tailed.
Moreover, we demonstrate that, in the world of not extremely heavy-tailed risks, VaR satis¯es the important condition of coherency,
which is a natural requirement to be imposed on a measure of risk from the points of view of exchange, regulators and society. However,
coherency of the value at risk is always violated if distributions of risks are extremely thick-tailed. We also obtain sharp bounds on the
VaR of the returns on portfolios of risks with long-tailed returns.
(iv) Another application of the main majorization results explored in depth in Ibragimov (2005) concerns the analysis of growth of
¯rms that invest into learning about the next period's optimal product. We present a study of robustness of the model of demand-driven
innovation and spatial competition over time with log-concavely distributed signals developed by Jovanovic and Rob (1987) to heavy-
tailedness assumptions. The implications of the model remain valid for not extremely long-tailed distributions of consumers' signals.
However, again these properties are reversed for signals with extremely thick-tailed densities.
(v) We study transmission of traits through generations in multifactorial inheritance models with sex- and time-dependent heritability.
We further analyze the implications of these models under heavy-tailedness of traits' distributions. Among other results, we show that in
the case of a trait (for instance, a medical or behavioral disorder or a phenotype with signi¯cant heritability a®ecting human capital in
an economy) with not very thick-tailed initial density, the trait distribution becomes increasingly more peaked, that is, increasingly more
concentrated and unequally spread, with time. But these patterns are reversed for traits with su±ciently heavy-tailed initial distributions
(e.g., a medical or behavioral disorder for which there is no strongly expressed risk group or a relatively equally distributed ability with
signi¯cant genetic in°uence). Such traits' distributions become less peaked over time and increasingly more spread in the population.
10Further intuition behind the power of bundling is that, for light-tailed distributions, it reduces uncertainty about consumers' valua-
tions and leads to a decrease in extreme values of the distribution of valuations per good, thereby reducing buyer diversity and increasing
the predictive power of the selling strategy (see Schmalensee, 1984, and Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999).
61.2. Thick tails and extremely thick tails and extensions to the case of dependence. To illustrate the
main ideas of the proof and in order to simplify the presentation of the main results in this paper, we model heavy-
tailedness using the framework of independent stable distributions and their convolutions. More precisely, the class
of not extremely thick-tailed distributions is modelled using convolutions of stable distributions with (di®erent)
indices of stability greater than one. Similarly, the results of the paper for extremely heavy-tailed case are ¯rst
presented and proven using the framework of convolutions of stable distributions with characteristic exponents less
than one. The former class has tail exponents ® > 1 and for the latter class one has ® < 1:
However, as follows from the extensions of the majorization results in Appendix A1 in this paper to the dependent
case obtained in Ibragimov (2004), all the results obtained in the paper continue to hold for a wide class of multivariate
distributions for which marginals are dependent and can be non-identical and, in addition to that, can have ¯nite
variances, unlike stable distributions and their convolutions. Namely, all the results in the paper continue to hold
for convolutions of dependent r.v.'s with joint ®¡symmetric distributions and their analogues with non-identical
marginals.11 The class of ®¡symmetric distributions is very wide and includes, in particular, spherical distributions
corresponding to ® = 2: Important examples of spherical distributions, in turn, are given by Kotz type, multinormal
and logistic distributions and multivariate stable laws. In addition, they include a subclass of mixtures of normal
distributions as well as multivariate t¡distributions that were used in a number of papers to model heavy-tailedness
phenomena with dependence and ¯nite moments up to a certain order (see, among others, Praetz, 1972, Blattberg and
Gonedes, 1974, and Glasserman et. al., 2002). Moreover, the class of ®¡symmetric distributions includes a wide
class of convolutions of models with common shocks a®ecting all consumers' valuations (such as macroeconomic
or political ones, see Andrews, 2003) which are of great importance in economics and ¯nance. Similar to the
framework based on stable distributions, optimal bundling strategies for substitutes and consumers' tastes with
joint ®¡symmetric distributions with relatively large ®0s are the opposites of those for complements and buyers'
tastes with ®¡symmetric distributions with relatively small ®0s. The proof of these generalizations is completely
similar to the proof of the main results in this paper.
One should also emphasize here that the results in the paper do not require the distributions entering their
assumptions to be extremely heavy-tailed with ® < 1 in order to exhibit reversals of optimal bundling strategies for
interrelated goods. Namely, as we demonstrate, optimal bundling strategies of a multiproduct monopolist depend
crucially on both thick-tailedness of the tastes (characterized by the tail parameters ®) as well as on the degree
r of complementarity or substitutability among the products provided, with r > 1 corresponding to the case of
complements and r < 1 modelling the case of substitutes. For instance, the characterizations of the optimal bundling
strategies for the seller of baskets of complements or substitutes derived in the paper depend on comparisons between
® and r: Therefore, the strategies exhibit reversal patterns even in the case when consumers have tastes with ® > 1:
Namely, the optimal bundling strategies of a multiproduct monopolist providing complements with r > ® on auctions
or for pro¯t-maximizing prices are reversals of her optimal strategies in the case of substitutes (for which r < 1) and
of those in the case of complements with 1 < r < ®:12
11An n¡dimensional distribution is called ®¡symmetric if its characteristic function can be written as Á((
Pn
i=1 jtij®)1=®); where Á is
a continuous function and ® > 0: Such distributions should not be confused with multivariate spherically symmetric stable distributions,







; 0 < ¯ · 2: Obviously, spherically symmetric stable distributions are
particular examples of ®¡symmetric distributions with ® = 2 (that is, of spherical distributions) and Á(x) = exp(¡x¯):
12The case r > ® corresponds to complements with relatively high degree of complementarity. Similarly, the case 1 < r < ® represents
7We also note that all the results in the paper are available for the case of skewed distributions, including skewed
stable distributions (such as, for instance, extremely heavy-tailed L¶ evy distributions with ® = 1=2 concentrated on
the positive semi-axis) and, according to the extensions discussed above, ®¡symmetric distributions with skewed
marginals. Therefore, this paper, in fact, succeeds in the uni¯cation of the analysis of the e®ects of all the main
distributional properties of consumers' valuations, including heavy-tailedness, dependence, skewness and the case of
non-identical one-dimensional distributions, on optimal bundling strategies for a multiproduct monopolist.
1.6. Organization of the paper. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains notations and de¯nitions
of classes of distributions used throughout the paper and reviews their basic properties. Section 3 describes our
framework for modelling optimal bundling with interrelated goods. Sections 4 and 5 present the main results of
the paper on optimal bundling strategies for complements and substitutes with heavy-tailed tastes. Section 4 deals
with the setting where the products and their bundles are provided on an auction. Section 5 considers the case
where the prices for goods and their bundles are set by the monopolist. Appendix A1 reviews peakedness properties
of log-concavely distributed r.v.'s and presents their analogues in the case of heavy-tailed distributions needed for
the proof of the main results in the paper. In particular, the appendix reviews peakedness properties of r.v.'s
with log-concave densities established by Proschan (1965) and presents their analogues in the case of heavy-tailed
distributions obtained in Ibragimov (2004). Finally, Appendix A2 contains proofs of the results obtained in the
paper.
2. NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
In this section, we introduce classes of distributions we will be dealing with throughout the paper.
We say that a r.v. X with density f : R ! R and the convex distribution support ­ = fx 2 R : f(x) > 0g is
log-concavely distributed if log f(x) is concave in x 2 ­; that is, if for all x1;x2 2 ­; and any ¸ 2 [0;1];
f(¸x1 + (1 ¡ ¸)x2) ¸ (f(x1))¸(f(x2))1¡¸: (2.1)
(see An, 1998). A distribution is said to be log-concave if its density f satis¯es (2.1).
If a r.v. X is log-concavely distributed, then its density has at most an exponential tail, that is, f(x) =
o(exp(¡¸x)) for some ¸ > 0; as x ! 1 and all the power moments EjXj°; ° > 0; of the r.v. exist (see Corollary
1 in An, 1998). The reader is referred to Karlin (1968), Marshall and Olkin (1979) and An (1998) for a survey of
many other properties of log-concave distributions.13
Throughout the paper, LC denotes the class of symmetric log-concave distributions.14
complements with relatively low degree of complementarity.
13Some of these properties are the following:
Any log-concave density is unimodal. Moreover, it has the property of strong unimodality, that is, its convolution with any other
unimodal density is again unimodal;
The class of log-concave distributions is closed under convolutions;
The survivor and distribution functions of log-concave densities are both log-concave and, thus, a log-concavely distributed r.v. has
the new-better-than-used property;
A log-concave density is of P¶ olya frequency of order 2 (PF-2);
The hazard function of a log-concave density is monotonically increasing.
Examples of log-concave distributions include the normal distribution, the uniform density, the exponential density, the Gamma
distribution ¡(®;¯) with the shape parameter ® ¸ 1; the Beta distribution B(a;b) with a ¸ 1 and b ¸ 1; the Weibull distribution
W(°;®) with the shape parameter ® ¸ 1:
14LC stands for \log-concave".
8For 0 < ® · 2; ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ¹ 2 R; we denote by S®(¾;¯;¹) the stable distribution with the
characteristic exponent (index of stability) ®; the scale parameter ¾; the symmetry index (skewness parameter) ¯
and the location parameter ¹: That is, S®(¾;¯;¹) is the distribution of a r.v. X with the characteristic function
E(eixX) =
(
expfi¹x ¡ ¾®jxj®(1 ¡ i¯sign(x)tan(¼®=2))g; ® 6= 1;
expfi¹x ¡ ¾jxj(1 + (2=¼)i¯sign(x)lnjxjg; ® = 1;
x 2 R; where i2 = ¡1 and sign(x) is the sign of x de¯ned by sign(x) = 1 if x > 0; sign(0) = 0 and sign(x) = ¡1
otherwise. In what follows, we write X » S®(¾;¯;¹); if the r.v. X has the stable distribution S®(¾;¯;¹):
A closed form expression for the density f(x) of the distribution S®(¾;¯;¹) is available in the following cases
(and only in those cases): ® = 2 (Gaussian distributions); ® = 1 and ¯ = 0 (Cauchy distributions); ® = 1=2 and
¯ § 1 (L¶ evy distributions).15 Degenerate distributions correspond to the limiting case ® = 0:
The index of stability ® characterizes the heaviness (the rate of decay) of the tails of stable distributions
S®(¾;¯;¹): The distribution of a stable r.v. X » S®(¾;¯;¹) with ® 2 (0;2) obeys power law (1.1) and thus
the p¡th absolute moments EjXjp of X are ¯nite if p < ® and are in¯nite otherwise. The symmetry index ¯
characterizes the skewness of the distribution. The stable distributions with ¯ = 0 are symmetric about the location
parameter ¹: The stable distributions with ¯ = §1 and ® 2 (0;1) (and only they) are one-sided, the support of
these distributions is the semi-axis [¹;1) for ¯ = 1 and is (¡1;¹] (in particular, the L¶ evy distribution with ¹ = 0
is concentrated on the positive semi-axis for ¯ = 1 and on the negative semi-axis for ¯ = ¡1). In the case ® > 1 the
location parameter ¹ is the mean of the distribution S®(¾;¯;¹): The scale parameter ¾ is a generalization of the
concept of standard deviation; it coincides with the latter in the special case of Gaussian distributions (® = 2).
Distributions S®(¾;¯;¹) with ¹ = 0 for ® 6= 1 and ¯ 6= 0 for ® = 1 are called strictly stable. If Xi » S®(¾;¯;¹);








For a detailed review of properties of stable distributions the reader is referred to, e.g., the monographs by
Zolotarev (1986) and Uchaikin and Zolotarev (1999).
For 0 < r < 2; we denote by CS(r) the class of distributions which are convolutions of symmetric stable
distributions S®(¾;0;0) with characteristic exponents ® 2 (r;2] and ¾ > 0.16 That is, CS(r) consists of distributions
of r.v.'s X such that, for some k ¸ 1; X = Y1 + ::: + Yk; where Yi; i = 1;:::;k; are independent r.v.'s such that
Yi » S®i(¾i;0;0); ®i 2 (r;2]; ¾i > 0; i = 1;:::;k:
Further, for 0 < r · 2; CS(r) stands for the class of distributions which are convolutions of symmetric stable
distributions S®(¾;0;0) with indices of stability ® 2 (0;r) and ¾ > 0:17 That is, CS(r) consists of distributions
of r.v.'s X such that, for some k ¸ 1; X = Y1 + ::: + Yk; where Yi; i = 1;:::;k; are independent r.v.'s such that
Yi » S®i(¾i;0;0); ®i 2 (0;r); ¾i > 0; i = 1;:::;k:
Finally, we denote by CSLC the class of convolutions of distributions from the classes LC and CS(1): That is,
15The densities of Cauchy distributions are f(x) = ¾=(¼(¾2 + (x ¡ ¹)2)): L¶ evy distributions have densities f(x) =
(¾=(2¼))1=2exp(¡¾=(2x))x¡3=2; x ¸ 0; f(x) = 0; x < 0; where ¾ > 0; and their shifted versions.
16Here and below, CS stands for \convolutions of stable"; the overline indicates that convolutions of stable distributions with indices
of stability greater than the threshold value r are taken.
17The underline indicates considering stable distributions with indices of stability less than the threshold value r:
9CSLC is the class of convolutions of symmetric distributions which are either log-concave or stable with characteristic
exponents greater than one.18 In other words, CSLC consists of distributions of r.v.'s X such that X = Y1 + Y2;
where Y1 and Y2 are independent r.v.'s with distributions belonging to LC or CS(1):
All the classes LC; CSLC; CS(r) and CS(r) are closed under convolutions. In particular, the class CSLC coincides
with the class of distributions of r.v.'s X such that, for some k ¸ 1; X = Y1 + ::: + Yk; where Yi; i = 1;:::;k; are
independent r.v.'s with distributions belonging to LC or CS(1):
A linear combination of independent stable r.v.'s with the same characteristic exponent ® also has a stable
distribution with the same ®: However, in general, this does not hold true in the case of convolutions of stable
distributions with di®erent indices of stability. Therefore, the class CS(r) of convolutions of symmetric stable
distributions with di®erent indices of stability ® 2 (r;2] is wider than the class of all symmetric stable distributions
S®(¾;0;0) with ® 2 (r;2] and ¾ > 0: Similarly, the class CS(r) is wider than the class of all symmetric stable
distributions S®(¾;0;0) with ® 2 (0;r) and ¾ > 0:
Clearly, CS(1) ½ CSLC and LC ½ CSLC: It should also be noted that the class CSLC is wider than the class of
(two-fold) convolutions of log-concave distributions with stable distributions S®(¾;0;0) with ® 2 (1;2] and ¾ > 0:
By de¯nition, for 0 < r1 < r2 · 2; the following inclusions hold: CS(r2) ½ CS(r1) and CS(r1) ½ CS(r2):
In some sense, symmetric (about ¹ = 0) Cauchy distributions S1(¾;0;0) are at the dividing boundary between
the classes CS(1) and CS(1) (and between the classes CS(1) and CSLC). Similarly, for r 2 (0;2); symmetric stable
distributions Sr(¾;0;0) with the characteristic exponent ® = r are at the dividing boundary between the classes
CS(r) and CS(r): Further, symmetric normal distributions S2(¾;0;0) are at the dividing boundary between the class
LC of log-concave distributions and the class CS(2) of convolutions of symmetric stable distributions with indices of
stability ® < 2:19
In what follows, we write X » LC (resp., X » CSLC; X » CS(r) or X » CS(r)) if the distribution of the r.v. X
belongs to the class LC (resp., CSLC; CS(r) or CS(r)). We also denote R+ = [0;1):
It is natural to refer to distributions from the class CS(1) (and, more generally, to those from the classes CS(r)
with relatively small r) as very heavy-tailed. Similarly, it is natural to refer to distributions from the classes CSLC
and CS(1) (or the classes CS(r) with relatively high r) as not too thick-tailed ones. We will follow these conventions
in the rest of the paper.
3. A FRAMEWORK FOR OPTIMAL BUNDLING MODELS WITH INTERRELATED GOODS
Throughout the paper, we consider a setting with a single seller providing m goods to n consumers. Let
M = f1;2;:::;mg be the set of goods sold on the market and let J = f1;2;:::;ng denote the set of buyers. Let 2M
stand for the set of all subsets of M: As in Palfrey (1983), the seller's bundling decisions B are de¯ned as partitions
18CSLC is the abbreviation of \convolutions of stable and log-concave".
19More precisely, the symmetric Cauchy distributions are the only ones that belong to all the classes CS(r) with r > 1 and all the
classes CS(r) with r < 1: Symmetric stable distributions Sr(¾;0;0) are the only ones that belong to all the classes CS(r0) with r0 > r
and all the classes CS(r0) with r0 < r: Symmetric normal distributions are the only distributions belonging to the class LC and all the
classes CS(r) with r 2 (0;2):
10of the set of items M into a set of subsets, fB1;:::;Blg = B; where l is the cardinality of B; the subsets Bs 2 2M;
s = 1;:::;l; are referred to as bundles. That is, Bs 6= ; for s = 1;:::;l; Bs \ Bt = for s 6= t; s;t = 1;:::;l; and
[l
s=1Bs = M (see Palfrey, 1983, Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999, and Fang and Norman, 2003b). It is assumed that
the seller can o®er one (and only one) partition B for sale on the market (this referred to as pure bundling, see
Adams and Yellen, 1976).20 We denote by B = ff1g;f2g;:::;fmgg and B = f1;2;:::;mg the bundling decisions
corresponding, respectively, to the cases where the goods are sold separately (that is, on separate auctions or using
unbundled sales) and as a single bundle M:
For a bundle B 2 2M; we write card(B) for a number of elements in B and denote by ¼B the seller's pro¯t
resulting from selling the bundle. For a bundling decision B = fB1;:::;Blg; we write ¦B for the seller's total pro¯t
resulting from following B; that is, ¦B =
Pl
s=1 ¼Bs:
A risk-neutral seller prefers (strictly prefers) a bundling decision B1 to a bundling decision B2 ex ante if E¦B1 ¸
E¦B2 (resp., if E¦B1 > E¦B2), where E denotes the expectation operator. The seller prefers a bundling decision
B1 to a bundling decision B2 ex post if ¦B1 ¸ ¦B2 (a.s.), that is, if P(¦B1 ¸ ¦B2) = 1:
More generally, if the seller has an increasing utility of wealth function U : R+ ! R with U(0) = 0; then
she prefers (strictly prefers) a bundling decision B1 to a bundling decision B2 if EU(¦B1) ¸ EU(¦B2) (resp., if
EU(¦B1) > EU(¦B2)). The setting with a concave function U represents the case of a risk-averse seller with the
utility of wealth satisfying the property of diminishing returns. The case where U is convex models the framework
with a risk-loving seller.
A representative consumer's preferences over the bundles B 2 2M; on the other hand, are determined by her
reservation prices (valuations) v(B) for the bundles and, in particular, by her valuations v(fig) for goods i 2 M
(when the goods are sold separately) which are referred to as stand-alone reservation prices. In the case where
the reservation prices for bundles are nonnegative: v(B) ¸ 0; B 2 2M; it is said that the goods in M and their
bundles satisfy the free disposal condition.21 The free disposal assumption is particularly important in the case of
information goods and in the economics of the Internet (see Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999, 2000). If consumers'
valuations for a bundle of goods are additive in those of component goods: v(B) =
P
i2B v(fig); then the products
provided by the monopolist are said to be independently priced (see Venkatesh and Kamakura, 2003). Under free
disposal, the natural analogues of this property for interrelated goods are subadditivity v(B) ·
P
i2B v(fig) in the
case of substitutes and superadditivity
P
i2B v(fig) · v(B) in the case of complements (see Dansby and Conrad,
1984, Lewbel, 1985, and Venkatesh and Kamakura, 2003).
In our main results presented in the next two sections, Xi; i 2 M; denote i.i.d. r.v.'s representing the distribution
of consumers' tastes for goods i 2 M that determine their reservation prices for the goods and their bundles.
We suppose that a representative consumer's reservation price v(B) for a bundle B of goods produced by the
monopolist is a function of her tastes for the component goods in the bundle. More precisely, we model the
20The analysis of mixed bundling, in which consumers can choose among all bundling decisions available (see Adams and Yellen, 1976,
and McAfee et. al., 1989) is beyond the scope of this paper.
21The case where the support of the valuations v(B) intersects with (¡1;0) corresponds to the situation where the goods have negative
value to some consumers (e.g., articles exposing certain political views, advertisements or pornography in the case of information goods,
see Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999).
11setting with interrelated goods by assuming that a representative consumer's valuations for bundles B 2 2M are








; where, for r 2 (0;2]; gr(x) = xrI(x ¸ 0);
hr(x) = xjxjr¡1; x 2 R; and I(¢) stands for the indicator function. The valuations for goods i 2 M in the case
where they are sold separately are thus v(gr;fig) = gr(Xi) or v(hr;fig) = hr(Xi); i 2 M: Clearly, in the case
r = 1; one has v(h1;fig) = h1(Xi) = Xi; i 2 M: Also, the reservation prices v(gr;B) satisfy the free-disposal
condition: v(gr;B) ¸ 0 for all B 2 2M: It is easy to see that, for all B 2 2M; v(gr;B) ·
P
i2B v(gr;fig); if r · 1;
and
P
i2B v(gr;fig) · v(gr;B); if r ¸ 1; and Xi ¸ 0; i 2 B: That is, consumers' reservation price v(gr;B) for a
bundle is subadditive in those for the component products if r · 1; as it is typically required for substitutes, and is
superadditive in the rectangle of non-negative tastes if r ¸ 1; as it is usually assumed in the case of complements.
Similarly, for r · 1; the reservation prices v(hr;B) are subadditive in those for component products in the rectangle
of non-negative stand-alone valuation v(hr;fig) i 2 M; and are superadditive in the components' valuations in
the case where all the stand-alone valuations are non-positive. For r ¸ 1; the valuations for bundles v(hr;B)
are superadditive in those for the components if all the stand-alone reservation prices are non-negative and are
subadditive if the valuations for all component products are non-positive. More precisely, if v(hr;fig) ¸ 0; i 2 B;
then
P
i2B v(hr;fig) · v(hr;B) for r ¸ 1; and v(hr;B) ·
P
i2B v(hr;fig) for r · 1: If v(hr;fig) · 0; i 2 B; then
v(hr;B) ·
P
i2B v(hr;fig) for r ¸ 1; and
P
i2B v(hr;fig) · v(hr;B) for r · 1: The above super- and subadditivity
properties of v(hr;B) for r ¸ 1 are consistent with the assumption typically imposed on the value function of
(complementary) gains and losses in mental accounting and prospect theory (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979,
and Thaler, 1985). The case r = 1 with reservation prices for bundles v(h1;B) =
P
i2B Xi models the case of
independently priced goods.
For j 2 J; the jth consumer's tastes for goods in M are assumed to be ~ Xij; i 2 M; where ~ X(j) = ( ~ X1j;:::; ~ Xnj);
j 2 M; are independent copies of the vector (X1;:::;Xn); and her reservation prices vj(B) for bundles B 2 2M of








: The seller is assumed to know
only the distribution of consumers' reservation prices for goods in M and their bundles. The valuations vj(gr;B)
(vj(hr;B)) for bundles B 2 2M; are known to buyer j; however, the buyer has only the same incomplete information
about the other consumers' reservation prices as does the seller (see Palfrey, 1983).
4. MAIN RESULTS: OPTIMAL BUNDLED AUCTIONS FOR COMPLEMENTS
AND SUBSTITUTES WITH HEAVY-TAILED VALUATIONS
We ¯rst consider the case in which the goods in M sold by the monopolist and their bundles are provided through
Vickrey auctions (see Palfrey, 1983). In this setting, the buyers submit simultaneous sealed bids for bundles of goods
sold by the seller. The bidder with the highest bid wins the auction and pays the seller the second highest bid.
It is well-known that, in such a setup, a dominant strategy for each bidder is to bid her true reservation prices.
In accordance with the assumption of nonnegativity of bids and valuations usually imposed in the auction theory,
we suppose that, for j 2 J; the jth consumer's reservation price for a bundle B 2 2M of goods sold is given by
vj(gr;B) = gr(
P
i2B ~ Xij) ¸ 0: The seller's pro¯t from following a bundling decision B = fB1;:::;Blg is, evidently,
Pl
s=1 v(n¡1)(gr;Bs); where, for s = 1;:::;l; v(n¡1)(gr;Bs) denotes the second highest of consumers' reservation prices
for the bundle Bs (that is, the second highest order statistic of the reservation prices for the bundle).
12The following Theorem 4.1 extends the results in Palfrey (1983) and Chakraborty (1999) to the case of interrelated
goods (with an arbitrary degree of complementarity or substitutability) and consumers with long-tailed valuations.
According to the theorem, if consumers' tastes are not very heavy-tailed and the goods are independently priced or
are substitutes (or are complements with not very high degree of complementarity) then the risk-neutral auctioneer
strictly prefers separate provision of goods to any other bundling decision.
Theorem 4.1 Let r 2 (0;2); and let the reservation prices for bundles B 2 2M of goods from M be given by v(gr;B):
Suppose that the tastes Xi; i 2 M; are i.i.d. r.v.'s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;0); i 2 M; for some ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1]
and ® 2 (r;2]; where ¯ = 0 for ® = 1; or Xi » CS(r); i 2 M: Then, for all m ¸ 2; the risk-neutral seller strictly
prefers (ex ante) B (that is, m separate Vickrey auctions) to any other bundling decision.
Remark 4.1 From the proof of Theorem 4.1 it follows that, under its assumptions, for any bundle B 2 2M with
the number of elements card(B) = k ¸ 2; the seller's pro¯t ¼B from selling B on a Vickrey auction is strictly
(¯rst-order) stochastically dominated by the pro¯t from selling one of goods in B; say good i 2 B; separately k times,
that is, by the r.v. k¼i; where ¼i = ¼Bi with Bi = fig: Namely, for all x > 0; one has P(¼B > x) < P(k¼i > x) that
means that selling one of goods in B k times separately is always likely to generate higher pro¯ts to the seller than
selling the bundle B: We get, therefore, by Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994, pp. 3-4), that EU(¼B) · EU(k¼i) for
all increasing functions U : R+ ! R for which the expectations exist. Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.2 below,
this, in turn, implies that Theorem 4.1 holds as well in the case of a risk-loving seller with any increasing convex
utility of wealth function U such that U(0) = 0:
There are no counterparts of Theorem 4.1 for very heavy-tailed distributions of consumers' valuations (such as
CS(r)) if the seller is risk-neutral since, as it is not di±cult to see, in this case, the seller's expected pro¯ts from
following any bundling decision are in¯nite. However, in the case of a risk-averse seller with a concave utility of
wealth function, the following reversal of Theorem 4.1 holds.
According to the following Theorem 4.2, in the latter case, the auctioneer strictly prefers providing all the items
through one Vickrey auction to any other bundling decision, if consumers' tastes are very heavy-tailed and the goods
are independently priced or are complements (or are substitutes with not very high degree of substitutability).
Theorem 4.2 Let r 2 (0;2]; and let the reservation prices for bundles B 2 2M of goods from M be given by v(gr;B):
Suppose that the tastes Xi; i 2 M; are i.i.d. r.v.'s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;0); i 2 M; for some ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1]
and ® 2 (0;r); where ¯ = 0 for ® = 1; or Xi » CS(r); i 2 M: If the seller's utility of wealth is concave, then, for all
m ¸ 2; the seller strictly prefers (ex ante) B (that is, a single Vickrey auction) to any other bundling decision.
The underlying intuition behind the results given by Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 is the following. As follows from
the results in Appendix A1, if consumers' tastes are not very heavy-tailed, then distributions of their valuations
per good in bundles become increasingly more concentrated (more peaked) as the size of bundles becomes larger.
Therefore, it is increasingly more likely that consumers with not too thick-tailed tastes are willing to pay more for a
set of goods if they are provided separately. Thus, the monopolist's total pro¯t is likely to be maximized if goods in
13the bundles are sold on separate auctions to such buyers. However, as the results in Appendix A1 imply, if buyers'
tastes are very long-tailed, then concentration (peakedness) of their valuations per good in bundles decreases with
the size of the bundles. Consequently, it is increasingly more likely that the seller's total pro¯t derived from a set of
products sold as a single bundle is greater than her pro¯t under separate provision of the goods to such consumers.
Using the general majorization properties of long-tailed distributions presented in Appendix A1, one can also
obtain the following Theorem 4.3 that characterizes buyers' preferences over the bundled auctions in the case of
independently priced goods and very heavy-tailed reservation prices.
Let j 2 J and let ~ x(j) = (~ x1j;:::; ~ xnj) 2 Rn
+: If a bundle B consisting of independently priced goods is o®ered for
sale on a Vickrey auction then the expectation of the surplus Sj(B; ~ x(j)) to consumer j with the values of stand-alone
reservation prices ~ X(j) = ~ x(j) and induced valuations for bundles vj(B) =
P
i2B ~ xij; B 2 2M; is (see Palfrey, 1983)

















i2B ~ Xit; B 2 2M; t 2 J; t 6= j: If the seller follows a bundling decision B = fB1;:::;Blg; then
the expectation of the surplus Sj(B; ~ x(j)) to the jth buyer with the vector of stand-alone valuations ~ X(j) = ~ x(j) is
ESj(B; ~ x(j)) =
Pl
s=1 ESj(Bs; ~ x(j)): The jth buyer with ~ X(j) = ~ x(j) is said to (strictly) prefer a bundling decision
B1 to a bundling decision B2; ex ante, if ESj(B1; ~ x(j)) ¸ ESj(B2; ~ x(j)) (resp., if ESj(B1; ~ x(j)) > ESj(B2; ~ x(j))). If
all buyers j 2 J (strictly) prefer a bundling decision B1 to a bundling decision B2 ex ante for almost all realizations
of their reservation prices ~ X(j); it is said that buyers unanimously (strictly) prefer B1 to B2 ex ante. More precisely,
buyers unanimously prefer (strictly prefer) a partition B1 to a partition B2 if, for all j 2 J; P[E(Sj(B1; ~ X(j))j ~ X(j)) ¸
E(Sj(B2; ~ X(j))j ~ X(j))] = 1 (resp., P[E(Sj(B1; ~ X(j))j ~ X(j)) > ESj(B2; ~ X(j))j ~ X(j))] = 1), where, as usual, E(¢j ~ X(j))
stands for the expectation conditional on ~ X(j): Clearly, in the case of absolutely continuous reservation prices Xi;
i 2 M; consumers unanimously prefer B1 to B2 ex ante if each of them prefers B1 to B2 for all but a ¯nite number
of realizations of their stand-alone valuations.
According to Theorem 4.3, consumers unanimously prefer (ex ante) separate provision of goods on Vickrey
auctions to any other bundling decision in the case of an arbitrary number of buyers, if their valuations are very
heavy-tailed, as modelled by positive stable distributions.22 These results are reversals of those given by Theorem 6
in Palfrey (1983) from which it follows that if consumers' valuations are concentrated on a ¯nite interval, then buyers
never unanimously prefer separate provision auctions if there are more than two buyers on the market (Theorem
4.3 does not contradict Theorem 6 in Palfrey, 1983, since the support of heavy-tailed distributions in Theorem 4.3
is the in¯nite positive semi-axis R+).
Theorem 4.3 Let the reservation prices for bundles B 2 2M be given by v(B) =
P
i2B Xi: Suppose that the stand-
alone reservation prices Xi; i 2 M; for goods in M are i.i.d. r.v.'s such that Xi » S®(¾;1;0) for some ¾ > 0 and
® 2 (0;1): Then buyers unanimously strictly prefer (ex ante) B (that is, n separate auctions) to any other bundling
decision.
The intuition behind the results given by Theorem 4.3 is similar to that behind Theorem 4.2 and is a reversal of
22As we indicated in Section 2, positive stable distributions are distributions S®(¾;1;0) with any ¾ > 0 and ® 2 (0;1): Any such
distribution is very thick-tailed.
14the intuition for the results in Palfrey (1983) and that for Theorem 4.1 above. Again, according to Appendix A1,
in the case of very heavy-tailed tastes, consumers' valuations per good for bundles become less concentrated about
the mean as the size of bundles increases. Buyers who are on the upper tail of the distributions for the goods are
more likely to win separate auctions and the next highest bidder is likely to have relatively lower valuations than
in the case of a bundled auction, as follows from the above. Therefore, contrary to the case of very light-tailed
valuations (see the discussion preceding Theorem 5 in Palfrey, 1983) the winner of the auction is likely to prefer
separate provision of the products.
Remark 4.2 As shown by Palfrey (1983), in Vickrey auctions with independently priced goods and an arbitrary
number of bidders, the total surplus (that is, the sum of the seller's pro¯t and buyers' surplus) is always maximized
in the case where the goods are provided on separate auctions. Palfrey (1983) also proves that, with two buyers, the
bidders unanimously prefer separate provision of items ex post and thus ex ante and the seller, on the other hand,
prefers a single auction. Since the above results are, essentially, deterministic, all they are robust with respect to risk
attitudes of the seller and the buyer. However, as discussed in Palfrey (1983), the ex post results on the seller's and
the buyers' preferences available in the two-buyer setup cannot be extended in any way to the case when there are
more than two buyers. On the other hand, from Theorem 4.2 with r = 1 and Theorem 4.3 it follows that, in the case
of an arbitrary number of buyers with (very heavy-tailed) positive stable reservation prices, the market participants'
ex ante preferences over the bundling decisions are the same as in the case of the ex post analysis for two-buyer
setting in Palfrey (1983). Namely, the seller's expected utility of wealth is maximized in the case of a single auction
and the buyers unanimously prefer separate provision of goods to any other bundling decision. Thus, the e®ects of
bundling on the seller's expected utility of wealth and the buyers' expected surplus continue to be the opposites of one
another, although (by Palfrey, 1983) the expected total surplus is still maximized under the separate provision.
5. MAIN RESULTS: OPTIMAL BUNDLING FOR COMPLEMENTS AND SUBSTITUTES
WITH THICK-TAILED VALUATIONS AND PRICES SET BY THE SELLER
We turn now to the case in which the prices for goods on the market and their bundles are set by the monopolist.
Let ci; i 2 M; be the marginal costs of goods in M: Suppose that the seller can provide bundles B of goods in M
for prices per good p 2 [0;pmax]; where pmax is the (regulatory) maximum price, with the convention that pmax can
be in¯nite. For a bundle of goods B 2 2M; denote by pB the pro¯t-maximizing price per good for the bundle, so
that the seller's expected pro¯t from selling B (at the price pB per good) is ¼B = J(kpB ¡
P
i2B ci)P(v(B) ¸ kpB);
where k = card(B): Clearly, in the case where the marginal costs are identical for goods produced by the seller,
that is, ci = c for all i 2 M; the values of pB are the same for all bundles B that consist of the same number
card(B) of goods. That is, pB = pB0; if card(B) = card(B0): With identical marginal costs, we denote by p the
pro¯t maximizing price per good in the case where all the goods in M are sold as a single bundle and by p the pro¯t
maximizing price of each good i 2 M under unbundled sales. That is, in the case where ci = c for all i 2 M; p = pB
with B = M; and p = pB with B = fig; i 2 M:
The following Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 characterize the optimal bundling strategies for a multiproduct monopolist
in the above setting with an arbitrary degree of complementarity or substitutability for goods in M (the cases of
valuations v(gr;B) and v(hr;B) with an arbitrary r 2 (0;2]). From Theorem 5.1 it follows that if consumers' tastes
15are not very heavy-tailed and the goods are independently priced or are substitutes (or are complements with not
very high degree of complementarity), then the patterns in seller's optimal bundling strategies are the same as in
the case of independently priced goods with log-concavely distributed valuations (see Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999,
and Fang and Norman, 2003b, and the discussion in Subsection 5.1 in the introduction to this paper).
Theorem 5.1 Let ¹ 2 R; r 2 (0;2); and let the reservation prices for bundles B 2 2M of goods from M be given
by v(gr;B) or by v(hr;B): Suppose that the tastes Xi; i 2 M; are i.i.d. r.v.'s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;¹); i 2 M; for
some ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ® 2 (r;2]; where ¯ = 0 for ® = 1; or Xi ¡ ¹ » CS(r); i 2 M: The risk-neutral seller
strictly prefers B to any other bundling decision (that is, the goods are sold as a single bundle), if ci = c; i 2 M; and
p < ¹: The risk-neutral seller strictly prefers B to any other bundling decision (that is, the goods are sold separately),
if ci ¸ ¹; i 2 M; or if ci = c; i 2 M; and p > ¹:
According to Theorem 5.2, the patterns in the solutions to the seller's optimal bundling problem in Theorem 5.1
are reversed if consumers' tastes are very heavy-tailed and the goods are independently priced or are complements
(or are substitutes with not very high degree of substitutability).
Theorem 5.2 Let ¹ 2 R; r 2 (0;2]; pmax < 1; and let the reservation prices for bundles B 2 2M of goods from M
be given by v(gr;B) or by v(hr;B): Suppose that the tastes Xi; i 2 M; are i.i.d. r.v.'s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;¹);
i 2 M; for some ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ® 2 (0;r); where ¯ = 0 for ® = 1; or Xi¡¹ » CS(r); i 2 M: The risk-neutral
seller strictly prefers B to any other bundling decision (that is, the goods are sold separately), if ci = c; i 2 M; and
p < ¹: The risk-neutral seller strictly prefers B to any other bundling decision (that is, the goods are sold as a single
bundle), if ci ¸ ¹; i 2 M; or if ci = c; i 2 M; and p > ¹:
Theorem 5.3 and 5.4 below give analogues of the results in Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 in the case of independently
priced goods (r = 1).
Theorem 5.3 Let ¹ 2 R; and let the reservation prices for bundles B 2 2M be given by v(h1;B) =
P
i2B Xi:
Suppose that the stand-alone reservation prices v(h1;fig) = Xi; i 2 M; for goods in M are i.i.d. r.v.'s such that
Xi » S®(¾;¯;¹); i 2 M; for some ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ® 2 (1;2]; or Xi ¡¹ » CSLC; i 2 M: Then the conclusion
of Theorem 5.1 holds.
Theorem 5.4 Let ¹ 2 R; pmax < 1; and let the reservation prices for bundles B 2 2M be given by v(h1;B) =
P
i2B Xi: Suppose that the stand-alone reservation prices v(h1;fig) = Xi; i 2 M; for goods in M are i.i.d. r.v.'s
such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;¹); i 2 M; for some ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ® 2 (0;1); or Xi ¡ ¹ » CS(1); i 2 M: Then the
conclusion of Theorem 5.2 holds.
Similar to the argument based on variance in Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999), the underlying intuition for Theo-
rems 5.1 and 5.3 is that for not very heavy-tailed distributions of reservation prices and the marginal costs of goods
on the right of the mean valuation, bundling decreases pro¯ts since it reduces concentration (peakedness) of the
valuation per good and thereby decreases the fraction of buyers with valuations for bundles greater than their total
16marginal costs (this is implied by the results in Appendix A1). For the identical marginal costs of goods less than
the mean valuation, bundling is likely to have the opposite e®ect on the pro¯t.
On the other hand, similar to Vickrey auctions in Section 4, the results in Theorems 5.2 and 5.4 are driven by
the fact that, in the case of very heavy-tailed reservation prices, concentration and peakedness of the valuations
per good in bundles decreases with their size (see Appendix A1). Therefore, bundling of goods in the case of very
long-tailed valuations and marginal costs of goods higher than the mean reservation price increases the fraction of
buyers with reservation prices for bundles greater than their total marginal costs and thereby leads to an increase
in the monopolist's pro¯t. This e®ect is reversed in the case of the identical marginal costs on the left of the mean
valuation.
Remark 5.3 The assumptions of Theorem 5.2 with r ¸ 1 (and those of Theorem 5.4) are satis¯ed, in particular,
for positive stable tastes (stand-alone reservation prices) Xi » S®(¾;1;¹); i 2 M; where ¾ > 0 and ® 2 (0;1); for
which thus the free disposal condition holds, including the L¶ evy distributions S1=2(¾;1;¹): Furthermore, from the
proof of Theorems 5.1-5.4 it follows that the ¯rst parts (second parts) of conclusions in the theorems hold as well in
the case of arbitrary marginal costs ci if the price per good pB in each bundle B 2 2M is less than (greater than) ¹:
One should also note here that the conditions pmax < 1 in Theorems 5.2 and 5.4 are necessary since otherwise the
monopolist would set an in¯nite price for each bundle of goods under very heavy-tailed distributions of consumers'
tastes considered in the theorems.
Remark 5.4 It is important to note that Theorems 5.2 and 5.4 shed new light on marketing strategies involving
exclusion of goods for which observations of extreme (both positive and negative) valuations are more likely from the
bundle and selling them separately. Such strategies are often observed on the market, in particular, in the bundling
decisions of cable and direct satellite broadcast television ¯rms that have marginal costs of reproduction close to
zero. The latter ¯rms typically o®er a \basic" bundle and use such strategies as pay-per-view approach for unusual
special events such as boxing matches (see Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999). The high valuations for the special events
are concentrated among a small fraction of consumers and thus are likely to be very heavy-tailed. Therefore, the
optimal bundling strategies for the special events are likely to be the opposites of those for light-tailed distributions
of valuations and thus, in contrast to the basic bundles, the events are likely to be provided on pay-per-view basis.
Season tickets for entertainment performances o®ered by sporting and cultural organizations that have su±ciently
high marginal costs of production might illustrate the dual pattern in bundling. It seems plausible that most of the
demand for season tickets is concentrated around a relative small fraction of consumers that have high valuations for
performances o®ered by the entertainment organization. The optimal strategy is to o®er tickets to such consumers
as a bundle, as predicted by our results for heavy-tailed tastes under the free disposal assumption or symmetric long-
tailed valuations in the case of su±ciently large marginal costs. This strategy is the opposite of separate provision
of the most of tickets to performances to consumers who are likely not to have very extreme valuations.
176. APPENDIX A1. MAJORIZATION AND PEAKEDNESS PROPERTIES
OF LOG-CONCAVE AND HEAVY-TAILED DISTRIBUTIONS
De¯nition 6.1 (Marshall and Olkin, 1979). Let a;b 2 Rn: The vector a is said to be majorized by the vector b;








i=1 b[i]; where a[1] ¸ ::: ¸ a[n] and
b[1] ¸ ::: ¸ b[n] denote components of a and b in decreasing order.
The relation a Á b implies that the components of the vector b are more diverse than those of a (see Marshall













; a 2 Rn
+; (6.1)
In particular,
(1=(n + 1);:::;1=(n + 1);1=(n + 1)) Á (1=n;:::;1=n;0); n ¸ 1: (6.2)
De¯nition 6.2 (Marshall and Olkin, 1979). A function Á : A ! R de¯ned on A µ Rn is called Schur-convex
(resp., Schur-concave) on A if (a Á b) =) (Á(a) · Á(b)) (resp. (a Á b) =) (Á(a) ¸ Á(b)) for all a;b 2 A: If, in
addition, Á(a) < Á(b) (resp., Á(a) > Á(b)) whenever a Á b and a is not a permutation of b; then Á is said to be
strictly Schur-convex (resp., strictly Schur-concave) on A:
The following concept of peakedness of r.v.'s was introduced by Birnbaum (1948).
De¯nition 6.3 (Birnbaum, 1948, see also Proschan, 1965, and Marshall and Olkin, 1979, p. 372). A r.v. X is
more peaked about ¹ 2 R than is Y if P(jX ¡¹j > x) · P(jY ¡¹j > x) for all x ¸ 0: If these inequalities are strict
whenever the two probabilities are not both 0 or both 1, then the r.v. X is strictly more peaked about ¹ than is Y: A
r.v. X is said to be (strictly) less peaked about ¹ than is Y if Y is (strictly) more peaked about ¹ than is X:
In the case ¹ = 0; we simply say that the r.v. X is (strictly) more peaked than Y:
Roughly speaking, a r.v. X is more peaked about ¹ 2 R than is Y; if the distribution of X is more concentrated
about ¹ than is that of Y:
Proschan (1965) obtained the following well-known result concerning majorization and peakedness properties of
tail probabilities of linear combinations of log-concavely distributed r.v.'s:
Proposition 6.1 (Proschan, 1965).23 If X1;:::;Xn are i.i.d. r.v.'s such that Xi » LC; i = 1;:::;n; then the function
Ã(a;x) = P
¡Pn
i=1 aiXi > x
¢
is strictly Schur-convex in a = (a1;:::;an) 2 Rn
+ for x > 0 and is strictly Schur-concave
in a = (a1;:::;an) 2 Rn
+ for x < 0:
23This proposition is formulated as Theorem 12.J.1 in Marshall and Olkin (1979) and is the main result in Section 12.J in the book.
Proschan's (1979) work is also presented, in a rearranged form, in Section 11 of Chapter 7 in Karlin (1968).
18Clearly, from Proposition 6.1 it follows that, under its assumptions,
Pn
i=1 aiXi is strictly more peaked than
Pn
i=1 biXi if a Á b and a is not a permutation of b:
Proschan (1965) notes that Proposition 6.1 also holds for (two-fold) convolutions of log-concave distributions with
symmetric Cauchy distributions and shows that comparisons implied by the proposition are reversed for n = 2k;
vectors a = (1=n;1=n;:::;1=n) 2 Rn with identical components and certain transforms of symmetric Cauchy r.v.'s.
Theorems 6.1-6.4 in this appendix give analogues of Proposition 6.1 for heavy-tailed r.v.'s obtained in Ibragimov
(2004) (see Theorems 2.1-2.4 in that paper). In particular, according to the following Theorem 6.1, the majorization
properties of convex combinations of r.v.'s in the classes CS(r) are of the same type as in Proposition 6.1 with
respect to the comparisons between the powers of components of the vectors of weights of the combinations.
Theorem 6.1 Let r 2 (0;2): If X1;:::;Xn are i.i.d. r.v.'s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;0); i = 1;:::;n; for some ¾ > 0;
¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ® 2 (r;2]; where ¯ = 0 for ® = 1; or Xi » CS(r); i = 1;:::;n; then the function Ã(a;x); a 2 Rn
+
in Proposition 6.1 is strictly Schur-convex in (ar
1;:::;ar




As follows from Theorem 6.2 below, the majorization and peakedness properties of the tail probabilities Ã(a;x)
in Theorem 6.1 are reversed in the case of r.v.'s from the classes CS(r):
Theorem 6.2 Let r 2 (0;2]: If X1;:::;Xn are i.i.d. r.v.'s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;0); i = 1;:::;n; for some ¾ > 0;
¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ® 2 (0;r); where ¯ = 0 for ® = 1; or Xi » CS(r); i = 1;:::;n; then the function Ã(a;x); a 2 Rn
+
in Proposition 6.1 is strictly Schur-concave in (ar
1;:::;ar




According to Theorem 6.3 below, peakedness and majorization properties of linear combinations of r.v.'s with not
too heavy-tailed distributions, as modelled, e.g., by convolutions of log-concave distributions and symmetric stable
distributions with characteristic exponents greater than one, are the same as in the case of log-concave distributions
in Proschan (1965).
Theorem 6.3 Proposition 6.1 holds if X1;:::;Xn are i.i.d. r.v.'s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;0); i = 1;:::;n; for some
¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ® 2 (1;2]; or Xi » CSLC; i = 1;:::;n:
As follows from Theorem 6.4, peakedness properties given by Proposition 6.1 and Theorem 6.3 above are reversed
in the case of r.v.'s with very heavy-tailed distributions, as modelled by convolutions of stable distributions with
indices of stability less than one.
Theorem 6.4 If X1;:::;Xn are i.i.d. r.v.'s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;0); i = 1;:::;n; for some ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1]
and ® 2 (0;1); or Xi » CS(1); i = 1;:::;n; then the function Ã(a;x) in Proposition 6.1 is strictly Schur-concave in
(a1;:::;an) 2 Rn
+ for x > 0 and is strictly Schur-convex in (a1;:::;an) 2 Rn
+ for x < 0:
19From Theorem 6.3 it follows that, similar to the class LC covered by Proposition 6.1,
Pn
i=1 aiXi is strictly more
peaked than
Pn
i=1 biXi for not too heavy-tailed X0
is; if a Á b and a is not a permutation of b: However, according
to Theorem 6.4, if a Á b and a is not a permutation of b; then
Pn




7. APPENDIX A2. PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let r 2 (0;2) and let Xi; i 2 M; be i.i.d. r.v.'s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;0); i 2 M; for
some ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1]; and ® 2 (r;2]; ¯ = 0 for ® = 1; or Xi » CS(r); i 2 M: Consider any bundle B 2 2M with
card(B) = k ¸ 2: Denote Hk(x) = P(
Pk
i=1 Xi · x); x 2 R: Clearly, the cdf of the r.v. v(gr;B) = gr(
P
i2B Xi) is
P(v(gr;B) · x) = Hk(x1=r) for x ¸ 0; P(v(gr;B) · x) = 0 otherwise. Therefore, we have that, for all x > 0; the
cdf of the seller's pro¯t ¼B resulting from selling B is
P(¼B · x) = P(v(n¡1)(gr;B) · x) = n(Hk(x1=r))n¡1 ¡ (n ¡ 1)(Hk(x1=r))n (7.1)
(this cdf is zero for x < 0). For i 2 M; let ¼i be the seller's pro¯t resulting from selling good i separately, that is,
¼i = ¼Bi with Bi = fig: For x > 0; the cdf of the r.v. k¼1 (that represents the seller's pro¯t resulting from selling
good 1 k times) is
P(k¼1 · x) = P(v(n¡1)(gr;f1g) · x=k) = n(H1(x1=r=k1=r))n¡1 ¡ (n ¡ 1)(H1(x1=r=k1=r))n: (7.2)
By Theorem 6.1 and comparisons (6.2), Hk(xk1=r) > H1(x); x > 0; and, therefore, Hk(x1=r) > H1(x1=r=k1=r);
x > 0: Since the function nyn¡1 ¡ (n ¡ 1)yn is increasing in y 2 (0;1); this, together with (7.1) and (7.2) implies
that P(¼B · x) > P(k¼1 · x) for all x > 0; and, therefore (see Shaked and Shanthikumar, 1994, pp. 3-4, and
Remark 4.1 in this paper), E(¼B) < E(k¼1) =
P
i2B E(¼i): Consequently, we get that for any bundling decision












E(¼i) = E(¦B): (7.3)
The proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Let r 2 (0;2] and let Xi; i 2 M; be i.i.d. r.v.'s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;0); i 2 M; for
some ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ® 2 (0;r); ¯ = 0 for ® = 1; or Xi » CS(r); i 2 M: Consider any bundle B 2 2M with
card(B) = k · m ¡ 1: With the same notations as in the proof of Theorem 4.1, comparisons (6.2) and Theorem
6.2 imply that Hk(xk1=r) > Hm(xm1=r); x > 0; and, therefore, Hk(x1=r) > Hm(x1=rm1=r=k1=r); x > 0: Similar to
the proof of Theorem 4.1, we get, therefore, that P(¼B · x) > P((k=m)¦B · x) for all x > 0: By Shaked and
Shanthikumar (1994, pp. 3-4) and the property that U is an increasing concave function with U(0) = 0; we get,
therefore, that EU(¼B) < EU((k=m)¦B) · (k=m)EU(¦B): Consequently, for any bundling decision B = fB1;:::;Blg














The proof is complete.
20Proof of Theorem 4.3. Let j 2 J: Let the vector ~ X(j) of the jth buyer's reservation prices for goods in M take
a value ~ x(j) = (~ x1j;:::; ~ xnj) 2 Rn
+; (~ x1j;:::; ~ xnj) 6= (0;0;:::;0): Consider any bundle B 2 2M with card(B) = k ¸ 2:
The j¡th buyer's reservation price for the bundle is vj(B) =
P
i2B ~ xij: Using the same notations as in the proof of
Theorem 4.1, we get, similar to Palfrey (1983), that the expected surplus to the buyer when B is o®ered for sale is







On the other hand, the expected surplus to consumer j when good i 2 B is o®ered for sale separately is ESj(fig; ~ x(j))
=
R ~ xij
0 (H1(x))n¡1dx: By Theorem 6.4 and (6.2), Hk(kx) < H1(x) for all x > 0: This, together with (7.4), implies




if vj(B) > 0: Since the function (H1(y))n¡1 is increasing in y 2 R+; from Theorem 3.C.1 in Marshall and Olkin (1979)




0 (H1(x))n¡1dx is Schur-convex in (y1;:::;yk) 2 Rk
+: Therefore, from




i=1 yi=k) for all (y1;:::;yk) 2 Rk
+












ESj(fig; ~ x(j)): (7.6)
From (7.5) and (7.6) we get
ESj(B; ~ x(j)) <
X
i2B
ESj(fig; ~ x(j)) (7.7)
if vj(B) > 0 (clearly, (7.7) holds as equality if vj(B) = 0). By (7.7), we have that if the seller follows a bundling
decision B = fB1;:::;Blg such that card(Bs) = ks; s = 1;:::;l; and kt ¸ 2 for at least one t 2 f1;:::;lg; then
the expected surplus ESj(B; ~ x(j)) to buyer j satis¯es ESj(B; ~ x(j)) =
Pl
s=1 ESj(Bs; ~ x(j)) <
Pm
i=1 ESj(fig; ~ x(j)) =
ESj(B; ~ x(j)): The proof is complete.
Proofs of Theorems 5.1-5.4. Let r 2 (0;2] and let ci; i 2 M; be arbitrary marginal costs of goods in









: Further, let ¹ 2 R and pmax < 1: Suppose that the tastes Xi; i 2 M; are
i.i.d. r.v.'s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;¹); i 2 M; for some ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ® 2 (0;r); ¯ = 0 for ® = 1; or
Xi¡¹ » CS(r); i 2 M: We will show that the seller's pro¯t maximizing bundling decision is B if the prices per good
pB < ¹ for all bundles B 2 2M; and is B if pB > ¹ for all B 2 2M: For a bundle B 2 2M; the pro¯t maximizing






P(v(B) ¸ kp) and the seller's pro¯t per







where k = card(B) is the number of goods in B: For i 2 M; let pi be the price of good i in the case where the goods
are sold separately (that is, in the case of the bundling decision B) and let, as in the proof of Theorem 4.1, ¼i be
the monopolist's pro¯t from selling the good, namely, pi = pBi and ¼i = ¼Bi with Bi = fig: As in the setup of the
optimal bundling problem in Section 5, in the case with ci = c for all i 2 M; we write p = pM for the price per good
in the case where all the m goods are sold as a single bundle B = M (that is, in the case of the bundling decision
B) and p for the price of each good under unbundled sales (that is, p = pB with B = fig; i 2 M).
21Suppose that pB < ¹ for all B 2 2M: Then from Theorem 6.4 and relations (6.2) it follows that, for any


























i2B E(¼i): This implies that
for any bundling decision B = fB1;:::;Blg such that card(Bs) = ks; s = 1;:::;l; and kt ¸ 2 for at least one
t 2 f1;:::;lg; comparisons (7.3) hold.
Suppose now that pB > ¹ for all B 2 2M: Then using again Theorem 6.4 and relations (6.2) we get that, for
















i=1 Xi ¸ (mpB)1=r): Therefore, for any bundling decision B = fB1;:::;Blg such that card(Bs) = ks;






























Xi ¸ (mpB)1=r) ·
l X
s=1
(ks=m)E(¦B) = E(¦B): (7.8)
From (7.3) and (7.8) we get that the pro¯t maximizing bundling decision is B if pB > ¹ for all B 2 2M and is B
if pB < ¹ for all B 2 2M:
Clearly, the condition that pB > ¹ for all B 2 2M is satis¯ed if ci ¸ ¹ for all i 2 M: Furthermore, in the
case of identical marginal costs ci = c; i 2 M; the condition that pB > ¹ for all B 2 2M holds if p > ¹: Indeed,
suppose that this not the case and there exists a bundle B 2 2M with card(B) = k > 1 and pB · ¹: Then, as
above, we get kE(¼1) = Jk(p ¡ c)P(X1 ¸ (p)1=r) < Jk(p ¡ c)P(
Pk
i=1 Xi ¸ (kp)1=r) · E(¼B): On the other hand,
E(¼B) = Jk(pB ¡ c)P(
Pk
i=1 Xi ¸ (kp)1=r) < Jk(pB ¡ c)P(X1 ¸ (pB)1=r) · kE(¼1); which is a contradiction.
Similarly, we get that if ci = c; i 2 M; then p < ¹ implies that pB < ¹ for all B 2 2M: This completes the proof of
Theorem 5.2. Theorem 5.4 follows from Theorem 5.2 with r = 1: Theorems 5.1 and 5.3 could be proven in a similar
way, with the use of Theorems 6.1 and 6.3 instead of Theorem 6.2. The proof is complete.
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